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Three Monkeys (2008): Oblivion, Anamnesis and the latent Spectrality of 
Hope 
Nuri Bilge Ceylan’s films evoke landscapes, characters and themes of undisclosed 
longing; with provocative situations of desperation and stranded existences, Ceylanian 
trysts, landscapes and human encounters also tend to be tinged with the fleeting hue of 
nostalgic daydream, and the lustre of unspoken aches. So often in Ceylan’s films what is 
most important goes unsaid, and remains unsayable; with the open ciphers of lonely 
wanderers, something from beyond the images and dialogue of the films stirs. Three 
Monkeys (Üç Maymun) starts with a night sequence in which a lone man drives along an 
unlit and isolated road; he hits something – a human being. With this, Servet, an 
ambitious politician, takes the decision to drive away and leave the body. This self-
interested decision kick-starts a sequence of events which soon implicates the lives and 
familial relationships of Servet’s driver Eyüp. This paper explores, analyses and 
discusses the characters and narrative of Ceylan’s Three Monkeys, using the 
philosophical of Ernst Bloch, Marc Augé, and Friedrich Nietzsche.   
Keywords: Ceylan; Bloch; Nietzsche; Augé; oblivion; anacoluthon   
Nuri Bilge Ceylan 
With international film successes as Distant (2002), Climates (2006), Three Monkeys (2008), 
Once Upon a Time in Anatolia (2011), and Winter Sleep (2014), the contemporary Turkish film 
director Nuri Bilge Ceylan has established himself as one of the most original and provocative 
Directors of the 21st century. It is curious therefore that to date there has been relatively little 
attempt by film and cultural studies scholars to explore the highly distinctive style, mood and 
thematic preoccupations of his film-making. Ceylan’s films encapsulate several acute tensions 
and seemingly irreconcilable paradoxes, contradictory tendencies that are best understood as 
 2 
 
moments of dialectical interplay. His work should also be understood in terms of the 
presence/absence of relationships and connections, as myths of modern urban living, imbued 
with alienation and isolation, and populated by estranged characters, who ironically pursue 
loneliness as a cure for their inability to form meaningful and enduring social and sexual 
relationships. In this respect, Ceylan’s cinema has an indispensable diagnostic value for the 
atomising tendencies of metropolitan modernity, urban identity, and the ambiguous space of 
the ambivalent existence of the stranger in exile.  
Ceylan’s lonely characters, with failing or failed relationships, and unwanted 
proximities, make for awkward silences. There is a pervasive inability or unwillingness to 
speak, a communication breakdown on screen that is not a lapse or pause between some kind 
of silent state of exception, but rather an enduring condition of incommunicability punctured 
and punctuated by occasional voices. So often in Ceylan’s films what is most important goes 
unsaid, indeed remains unsayable. This is a cinema of silence. Sometimes ‘movies’, sometimes 
‘talkies’, and sometimes neither. Undisturbed by action, uninterrupted by chatter, the screen is 
left empty for something else: time as suspension, time as the in-between.  
Aspects of Ceylan’s films evoke landscapes, characters and themes of undisclosed 
longing, sympathetic to the philosophical framework of the Marxist utopian thinker Ernst 
Bloch,1 Ceylan’s films contain (and provoke) traces of stalled and stranded existences. Shifting 
and drifting, the ubiquitous ‘Now’ time of Ceylanian trysts, landscapes and human encounters 
are often tinged with the fleeting hue of wistful daydream, and the lustre of an unspoken ache 
to progress towards some kind of redemptive moment. Adorning the canvas of each film with 
                                                          
1 Ernst Simon Bloch was born on 8 July 1885 to a working- class Jewish family in the German industrial city of 
Ludwigshafen. After a long and varied life and eventual academic career (Bloch didn’t gain his first formal 
academic position until he was in his 60s), he died in 1977 in Tübingen; for more detailed information and 
discussion of aspects of Bloch’s work see: Hudson (1982), Geoghegan (196), and Hammond (2017). 
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open ciphers of lonely wanderers, Ceylanian anti-heroes psychically murmur something from 
beyond the images and dialogue of the film. In concealing the undercurrents of inner moments, 
the un-narrated traces take us beyond the visual context and narrative specifics of each film.2 
An ideological or cultural surplus dwells, invisibly, on the periphery of Ceylan’s films. Beyond 
the immediate intention and authority of Ceylan as auteur, each film functions as a malleable 
utopian hieroglyph, which harbours – no matter how distant or obliterated – echoes of 
transformative possibility.3 Thwarted hopes and spoiled experiences produce wish-landscapes 
for a redemption that is not-yet conceivable,4 but always latent within alternative potential 
scenarios. Memories and traces embedded in each subjective past give form to unspent 
anticipations. Thus the uncanny utopian ciphers of death, loss, hopelessness (and, the latency 
of hope) continually manifest across his films; these remain open enough to chaotically invoke 
the mirage of a territory that is beyond any grounded conception. Landscapes and fleeting 
memories, flashback to regrets and hauntings from the past speak with the potent currency of 
a contemporary relevance. 
Incorporating a further application of Ernst Bloch’s work on the Trace, Ceylan’s films 
can be understood as having further utopian importance; they activate personal catalogues of 
                                                          
2 Benjamin Korstvedt, Listening for Utopia in Ernst Bloch's Musical Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 36-37, emphasizes this aspect of Blochian thinking, suggesting that art and culture, 
perceived as puzzle or cipher, provides, ‘access to the inner-realm, and this is needed, for in the darkness of 
the lived moment … we encounter something that reaches beyond and can break through not only the error of 
the world, but the prison house of the existentially specific’. 
3 Here, Bloch would suggest that, ‘every act of anticipating identifies itself to the utopian function, and the latter 
seizes on all possible substance in the surplus of the former’ (See Ernst Bloch, The Principle of Hope, (London: 
Blackwell, 1986), 150) 
4 Hudson (1982) summarises Bloch’s eclectic and fluid use of the notion of the ‘not-yet’: ‘not yet’ may mean 
‘not so far’, in which case it refers to the past as well as to the present. Then ‘not yet’ may mean ‘still not’, 
implying that something expected or envisaged in the past has failed to eventuate. Here the stress falls on the 
past non-occurrence, and in some cases this failure to eventuate in the past increases the likelihood of a future 
realisation. This ambiguity is even stronger in German since noch-nicht means both ‘still not’ and ‘not yet’. Or 
‘not yet’ may mean not so far, but ‘expected in the future’ … the utopian ‘not yet’ … implies that something is 
‘conceivable now but not yet possible’; and the eschatological ‘now and not yet’, which implies that the end is 
‘present now in a problematic manner, but still to come in its actual realisation’. Bloch uses all of these senses 
of ‘not yet’ (Hudson, 1982, p. 20) 
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traces and fragments of hope, which in turn elicit murmurs of potential, of alternative and 
transformed possibility.5 Confronted with reminders of incomplete material from the past – 
spectrally lingering in the present – a creative engagement with an unfolding of thought-images 
and undisclosed possibilities can emerge. 6  Traces thus emit a peculiar ability to act as 
mediatory reminders of stalled hope and possibility. As Bloch insists, nothing ‘is more human 
than venturing beyond what is … [a]nd humans on earth can alter course toward a destination 
that has not yet been decided – toward redemption or perdition’ (Bloch 1998, 345).7 The 
Blochian trace within the context of Ceylan’s films represents a concentric and powerful 
principle of loss, mourning and regret. But, in the cyclical perdition of Ceylan’s characters and 
loneliness-reverberating landscapes, there is no immediate or remediable solution for a good 
or certain future. 
Three Monkeys 
Three Monkeys (2008) Ceylan’s sixth film production starts with a night sequence, a lone man 
driving his car along an unlit and isolated road. The road is winding, and beyond the traces of 
the rear lights the car is camouflaged in an unyielding darkness. As the camera shot lingers on 
the expressionless face of the driver, it becomes evident that he is tired. Navigating the twists 
and turns of the meandering lane, his heavy and sleep-inducing eyelids keep trying to close. As 
the car drives on, we see it slip further in to the distance; as the red tail-lights dim and disappear, 
the car turns a corner and manoeuvres out of sight. And then, out of the enveloping black 
silence a distant sound of screeching tyres pierces the moment; the approaching headlights of 
                                                          
5 Indeed, Bloch offers his own work as a hieroglyphic trace-cipher; as Frederic Jameson notes, Bloch’s work 
radiates, ‘a peculiar inner warmth and power, spells and the key to spells, themselves patiently waiting for 
their own ultimate moment of decipherment’. See Frederic Jameson, “A Marxist Hermeneutic III: Ernst Bloch 
and the Future” in F. Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century Dialectical Theories of Literature, 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 158-9 
6 See Jack Zipe’s comments in The Utopian Function of Art & Literature. 
7 For more detailed and related discussions see Ernst Bloch (1977) ‘Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its 
Dialectics’, New German Critique, Spring 1977, issue 11, p: 31; Ernst Bloch (1976) ‘Dialectics and Hope’, New 
German Critique, Fall 1976, issue 9, pgs: 6-8; Douglas Kellner & Harry O’Hara (1976) ‘Utopia and Marxism in 
Ernst Bloch’, New German Critique, Fall 1976, issue 9, pgs: 21-25. 
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another oncoming vehicle slowly discloses the scene. The rain-glistening road reveals the 
aftermath of an accident. A body, concealed under the crumpled dark heap of an overcoat, lies 
motionless in the road; the somnambulistic driver character from the first car has hit a 
pedestrian. To avoid detection, the slinking character scurries away and hides behind the façade 
of his now stationary vehicle; and in a cowardly crouch he watches as two concerned but wary 
witnesses slowly drive past, note-down his vehicle registration and call the police. With this, 
the first driver, Servet – a cunning and ambitious politician – takes the decision to drive away 
and leave the body. In the early hours of the morning, Servet calls Eyüp (his driver) at home 
and demands that they urgently meet up. Against the serene backdrop of a dawn-lit harbour, 
they meet, and a lighthouse intersperses the dialogue as it emits the pulsing red beacon of a 
warning. With the following dialogue, Servet sets in place an egoistic and self-interested chain 
of events that destructively implicate Eyüp and the lives and relationships of Eyüp’s family.  
 [Servet]: I just called the lawyer. He says they won't suspect anything since you're my 
driver. Six months’ maximum. A year at the most. At least you'll get a lump sum when 
you're out. You know I'd never ask you if I wasn't running in the elections. If anyone 
hears about the accident, on the eve of the elections, my political career will end right 
there. You know that. They're just waiting to nail me, the bastards. Your son can get 
your salary every month. I'll pay the lump sum in cash when you get out. How's that? 
Let's not get the banks involved. Just in case. OK? 
[Eyüp]: OK. No problem. 
With this verbal transaction, the first two monkeys of the film are revealed. The first is the 
morally and emotionally bankrupt Servet who ‘sees no evil’ in the illegal and devastating 
consequences of the road accident, or indeed the cowardly nature of his request for Eyüp to 
take responsibility for his actions. Complicit with this, Eyüp’s subsequent silence – in going to 
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prison for the reckless actions of his egoistic and self-serving boss – belies the actions of a 
character who ‘speaks nothing’ about the evil of the criminal and reprehensible situation. 
Whilst obviously aware of the difficulty and disruption that this arrangement will cause for his 
wife Hacer and son İsmail, Eyüp does not allow this to puncture the silence of his unspoken 
acquiescence. He leaves Hacer to look after the house and to supervise the evidently idle and 
apathetic İsmail.  
Non-Place: Home as Shipwreck   
The family home is a precarious and breath-taking edifice of gravity-defying wonder, the 
construction of the unusual building resembles the jammed bow of a grounded ship, with its 
wider and upper ‘deck’ knubbling down to the narrowest part of a hull-type point. This, in turn, 
slices in to the terra firma of land, which seems to (just about) keep it upright, stable and afloat. 
Aloft the strange and shard-like construction, the family home forms the upper part of the 
ascending concentricity of dilapidated flats, as though in a stranded location of inescapable and 
stagnant concrete. The salvage is further buffered by an aggressive and inward-spiking fence, 
parallel to a sequence of railway tracks. And yet, in the distance, the limitless expanse of the 
ocean horizon beckons beyond the grounded wreckage; a cruel and permanent taunt. Situated 
on the top level of the decks, the family habitation serves the nostalgic function of the seafaring 
trope well. To quote Nietzsche: ‘On rope ladders I learned to climb to many a window … to 
flicker like small flames atop tall masts; a small light, to be sure, and yet a great comfort for 
stranded sailors and shipwreck survivors!’ (Nietzsche 2006, 156). The run-aground characters, 
physically isolated from the freedom of the sea, can do nothing but play out the suffocating 
tragedy of their lives against the latent immensity of the horizon.  
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Hans Blumenberg in Shipwreck with Spectator, sympathetic to this perception, 
proposes that a ‘perilous sea voyage … includes coasts and islands, harbours and the high seas, 
reefs and storms, shallows and calms, sail and rudder, helmsmen and anchorages, compass and 
astronomical navigation, lighthouses and pilots’ (Blumenberg 1997, 7). Importantly, the 
grounded ship of Eyüp’s flat, close – but separated from – the serenity of the harbour, and the 
unspecified journeys of meandering ships, is a disruptive mark which suggests the ‘deceptive 
face of something that is deeply problematic’ (Ibid., 10). Jammed in to the sediment of thwarted 
journeys, Eyüp and his family are subjected to a stagnancy, where ‘no one talks any more about 
voyages and courses, landings and harbours’ (Ibid., 73-74). Becalmed on the life-parched and 
adventureless islands of their lives, a resigned lethargy ossifies the dynamism and freedom of 
life. Marc Augé corroborates the existential poetics of this view, and notes that those who know 
how to read the ‘resistance and weakness of the shore, of the nature of its rocks and its soil, of 
its faults and its fractures’ (Augé 1995, 20), can see that the ‘sea has an initiatory value’ (Ibid., 
90). In this sense, the tangible immediacy of the harbour, as it reaches out towards the distant 
ocean, murmurs with metaphysical echoes which elicit a deep yearning and pull towards 
embarkation and freedom. The inviting immensity of the sea and the harbour conceals a 
symbolic space of powerful intimacy; a place where memories can either be anchored and 
crafted or alternatively cast adrift in to the depths of oblivion. This again chimes with Nietzsche 
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who in The Birth of Tragedy calls for us to gaze outwards, as the ocean ‘does not always roar, 
and at times it lies spread out like silk and gold and reveries of graciousness. But hours will 
come when you will realize that it is infinite and that there is nothing more awesome than 
infinity’ (Nietzsche 2007, 223). 
The aquatic allegory hued with longing and thirst is further borne out by Ceylan’s 
narrative tactics in relation to Hacer and İsmail’s names. Hacer as a name is a variation on 
Hagar, who, in Abrahamic theologies was the slave of Abram’s wife, Sarai, and, in order to 
conceive a child for Abram, became his second wife (or concubine). As the biblical narrative 
goes, Hagar, pregnant with Abram’s child, challenges the authority of Sarai, and in the 
consequences of the aftermath abandons the tribe. An angel finds Hagar in the desert by a 
fountain, close to the region of Shur.8 As a result of the encounter, Hagar returns to Abram and 
Sarai, and, as prophesied provides him with a son named İsmail. A number of years later, as a 
result of Sarai’s jealousy of İsmail – being the first born son, and the rightful heir to Abraham’s 
inheritance – both Hagar and İsmail are expelled from the tribe. Depleted of their meagre 
rations of bread and water, they wander the barrenness of the desert and call out to God for 
water. Within the narrative context of Three Monkeys, the stranded and precarious structure of 
the family flat (or, Shur) serves to shelter the family from a different type of desert, one that is 
‘surrendered to solitary individuality, to the fleeting, the temporary and ephemeral’ (Augé 
1995, 78). In the fractured and disaggregated exile of their lives (a contemporary state that 
Augé would refer to as supermodernity) they ‘are always, and never, at home’ (Ibid., 19). This 
transient form of non-place and human experience is lived out in ‘places and spaces, places 
and non-spaces [which] intertwine and tangle together. The possibility of non-place is never 
                                                          
8 For the biblical story surrounding Abram, Sarai and Hagar see Genesis 15-17 & 21. Interestingly, Moses could 
find no water in the desert wilderness of Shur (see Exodus 15:22); Shur can be translated as an enclosure, a 
wall, or, a ‘part’.  
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absent from any place. Place becomes a refuge to the habitué of non-places’ (Ibid., 107). As 
such the physically disconnected and existentially stranded context of the vessel of their home 
is reminiscent of a shelter for shipwrecked survivors, marooned on an alien and inhospitable 
land.9 
Further, the ruinous shell of their grounded abode, with its lack of connection to the 
immediate and surrounding location (throughout the film, there are no significant 
developments of community, human networks or productive relational connections) is also 
devoid of historical reference points or mutual legacies of human and cultural heritage. 
Meaningful traces of other human lives with roots or belonging are markedly absent; the home 
is therefore a space of mourning; bereft and obliterated, it harbours a dystopian ‘now’ and 
apocalyptic future. The architectural space of their domestic vessel is therefore a palimpsest 
‘on which the scrambled game of identity and relations’ (Ibid., 79), are rewritten as on a shifting 
canvass.     
Another trope of isolation and separation within the film, which further emphasises the 
geographical schism between the stranded survivors and the freedom of the sea is the disruptive 
slash of the train tracks. Here, the rigid trammelling of the tracks with the scheduled and 
predictable operation of the timetabled trains is a powerful juxtaposition to the skimming 
fluidity of the seafaring meander. Interestingly, İsmail makes a regular train journey to visit 
Eyüp in prison; indeed, as we observe and witness the first of İsmail’s prison visits, İsmail 
makes an initial move to transcend the imposition of separation between the ocean and stranded 
ship of home. As İsmail successfully scales the inward-spiking fence, his implied escape is 
headed off by an oncoming train. The train here is a powerful metaphor for the anchorage of 
his confined and mundane life. Confronted by this mechanized colossus of pre-assigned fate, 
                                                          
9 See also: Suner, A (2011) A Lonely and Beautiful Country: Reflecting Upon the State of Oblivion in Turkey 
Through Buri Bilge Ceylan’s Three Monkeys, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Vol. 12. No. 1. 
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İsmail shifts from the azimuth line of his ocean-facing ascent, to the perpendicularity of a walk 
alongside (and the ultimate journey inside) the rumbling capsule. As de Certeau (1984) notes, 
once subjected to the confinement of the train carriage, nothing inside or outside really moves:  
The unchanging traveller is pigeonholed, numbered, and regulated in the grid of the 
railway car … Everything has its place in a gridwork. Only a rationalized cell travels. 
A bubble of panoptic and classifying power, a module of imprisonment that makes 
possible the production of an order, a closed and autonomous insularity … the iron rail 
whose straight line cuts through space and transforms the serene identities of the soil 
into the speed with which they slip away into the distance (de Certeau 1984, 111-112).  
Hear no Evil and the Spectre of Oblivion 
Desperate to get İsmail in to some form of work, Hacer reluctantly agrees to secure some 
money to purchase a car. She arranges to visit Servet in his office, to ask him to release a 
portion of the money promised to Eyüp on his release from prison. The stilted meeting is 
punctuated by a telephone call made to Hacer’s mobile. Somewhat humorously, it takes a 
considerable amount of time for her to locate the ringing phone in her handbag. In a narrative 
sense this is fortuitous, as it allows the prophetic lyrics of the ring-tone to play out, lyrics which 
offer the following warning:     
I hope you love and aren't loved back. I hope love hurts you like it hurts me. I hope you 
yearn and are never reunited, like I was never reunited. I hope your heart is made to 
melt, just like a candle. I hope despair is always at your door, waiting just like a slave. 
I hope your heart is stolen away, just like wares from a market stall. 
As a result of being offered a lift home by Servet, Hacer is ultimately seduced by him, and the 
prophecy of ruin and despair, articulated by the lyrics from the song, remain unheard by Hacer. 
She gravitates towards the betrayal and inevitable shipwreck of the encounter. Indeed, the 
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lyrical references to yearning, being a slave and despair are again suggestive of the biblical 
roots of Hacer’s name: Hagar the slave, the mother of İsmail, exiled from the tribe of Abraham, 
denied the rightful inheritance for her son (Isaac, Abraham and Sarah’s son, was born after 
İsmail, and yet Isaac received Abraham’s inheritance). Intriguingly, Three Monkeys 
atmospherically reveals the spectre of thwarted heritage, in quite a literal sense, in the form of 
a ghostly boy-figure. In İsmail’s apparition, maintaining the aquatic leitmotif, the boy is 
dripping with water. A brief one-word reference from İsmail identifies the spectral vision as a 
trace apparition of his brother. The young boy-spectre appears one more time, with the drape 
of an arm over Eyüp’s neck, as he rests on a bed in the flat after his release from prison 
(contemplating his suspicion that Hacer had an affair with Servet while he was locked away). 
The uncanny apparition of the brother (or, the son) is never explicitly explored or discussed as 
part of the film’s narrative. The spectre of thwarted heritage, and the latency of redemption or 
restoration disrupts and provokes the unfolding story but is never given a cause, context or 
explanation. 
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The Three Monkeys’ spectral apparition is therefore anacoluthic.10 In this sense the dead 
child – as younger brother or lost son – as spectral-anacoluthon inserts an interruption or 
discontinuation in to the otherwise steady flow of image and dialogue. From this definition, the 
non-narrated anacoluthon, located on the threshold of the regular syntax of the film, represents 
a deviation, a rupture, a break and fragment of incompletion. Derrida defines the speculative 
nature of anacoluthon, emphasizing that it is ‘more than a figure of rhetoric, despite 
appearances, it signals in any case toward the beyond of rhetoric within rhetoric. Beyond 
grammar within grammar‘ (Derrida 2002, 167). 11  Linking the disruptive principles of 
anacoluthon to the spectre, Derrida and Stiegler further note that the ‘spectre is first and 
foremost something visible. It is of the visible, but of the invisible visible, it is the visibility of 
a body which is not present in flesh and blood‘ (Derrida and Stiegler 2002, 115). Similarly, de 
Certeau suggests that the uncanny space projected and provoked by spirits and spectres 
produces a ‘poetic geography on top of the geography of the literal, or permitted meaning’ (de 
Certeau 1984, 105). A spectre therefore consists of debris, a lingering remnant loaded with rich 
silences or wordless stories, ‘opaque acts … articulated by lacunae’ (Ibid., 107). As such, 
spectral meanings: 
do not speak any more than they see. This is a sort of knowledge that remains silent. 
Only hints of what is known but unrevealed … fragmentary and inward-turning 
histories, pasts that others are not allowed to read, accumulated times that can be 
unfolded but like stories held in reserve, remaining in an enigmatic state (Ibid., 105). 
                                                          
10 A literal translation of an-akolouthos suggests “not following” or disruption in relation to an otherwise 
patterned sequence of communication, which serves to fracture the synthesis of the whole. 
11 Many thanks to Nathaniel J. P. Barron for affording access to his unpublished PhD thesis: ‘Language in Ernst 
Bloch’s Materialism: A Reading of Anacoluthon’, and in so doing expanding my understanding of anacoluthon. 
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The anacoluthic and spectral image of the boy in Three Monkeys harbours the historical 
wreckage of a wordless hollow space, and the oblivion of memory. Here the past sleeps ‘in the 
everyday acts of walking, eating, going to bed, in which ancient revolutions slumber’ (Ibid., 
108). Further, Augé observes that ‘memory itself needs forgetfulness’ (Augé 2004, 3), and that 
the forgetfulness and silence of oblivion is necessary for both society and the individual as it 
is essential to forget in order to, at some point, remember the incomplete character of the 
present. Thus, memory and oblivion ‘in some way have the same relationship as life and death’ 
(Ibid., 14). Where the forgetfulness of oblivion is associated with death, the defibrillation of 
memory is associated with birth and life. This ‘brings in turn conceptions of death into play 
(death as another life or death as inherent to life) that in turn command the roles given to 
memory and oblivion’ (Ibid., 15). From the oblivion of forgetting, to the spectrality and 
shocking re-emergence of remembrance, the feeling that something is missing opens up, 
revealing a void that is imbued with the fleeting ache for restoration and fulfilment. Through 
the stifled and constricted burden of their confessional aches, İsmail and Eyüp – loaded with 
their spectral revelations – lumber through their lives with a nostalgic burden of 
incompleteness.  
Here we must also consider the importance of the astonishment associated with the 
impromptu appearance of the spectre, which irrupts out of the experience of the empty-space. 
In this context Bloch, in ‘Excavation of the Brocken’ makes a tentative connection to the beauty 
of the Harz Mountains in Germany and the notion of the Brocken Spectre (Bloch 1998). The 
Harz mountain range is the location of the Brocken mountain peak from where the spectral 
apparition known as the Brocken Spectre derives its name. Bloch’s analytical flirtation with 
the evocation of the beautiful mystery and emptiness of the Brocken tentatively develops this 
notion of spectral astonishment, and is well worth elaboration and development, particularly in 
relation to the spectral apparition in Three Monkeys. Bloch notes that the Brocken spectral 
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apparition is like taking a pilgrimage back in to childhood, where no adequate word exists for 
the space and emptiness generated by its haunting apparition. The ancient knells which ring 
from the soundbow of the spectral hollow-space, act as reminders that poignant and unsettling 
visitations, hearken to the intriguing centre of a primordial astonishment – the revelation of a 
secret in broad daylight (Bloch 1998, 388-89). 
  
The Brocken Spectre is a phenomenon traditionally associated with the study of 
atmospheric optics.12 As an optical effect, it appears in places of higher altitude. Brocken 
spectres only reveal themselves under specific atmospheric conditions, notably, when a low-
lying sun flanks a hillwalker or mountain climber (on one side), complemented, on the 
opposing side, with a mist or fog-bank. When both altitude and climatic conditions are 
conducive, a Brocken-spectral optical effect may be produced. The effect itself consists of a 
bright, concentrically ringed glory, which surrounds the ‘shadow of the observer’s head’ 
(Talman 1913, 275). Punctured through the centre of the glory, we find the projected empty-
space of a dark and vacuous shadow, an emulatory emptiness, which mimics the particular 
shape of the climber’s human form. Significantly, the initial appearance of the spectral 
visitation in Three Monkeys closely resembles this depiction.  
This particular atmospheric phenomenon has been embraced and creatively explored 
by writers such as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, William Wordsworth and Thomas De Quincey. 
This is due to the fact that the Brocken Spectre constitutes a potent symbol of an alienated 
                                                          
12 Naylor, J. (2002) Out of the Blue: A 24-hour Skywatcher’s Guide, p: 39-46. Cambridge Uni Press; Lynch, D. K. & 
Livingston, W. (2001) Colour and Light in Nature, 2nd Ed, p: 11. Cambridge Uni Press. See also Tape, Walter. 
(1994) Atmospheric Halos. Antarctic Research Series, Vol. 64. American Geophysical Union, Washington; Tape, 
Walter. & Moilanen, Jarmo. (2006) Atmospheric Halos and the Search for Angle X, American Geophysical Union, 
Washington. 
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subject (Wright 1980). The Brocken-spectral effect produces a human shadow which is created 
by but separated from nature. Further, the haunting apparition of the Brocken Spectre has a 
peculiar ability to reveal to its witnesses their ‘alienation’ who ‘rather than recognising [their] 
shadow as a projected Form of [their] own Being ... recoil from it as from a Spectre’ (Gaston 
2004). This is attributable to the metaphoric power of the idea (and also meditations on) the 
emptiness of the human-shadow; the spectral apparition articulates in some way an outward 
manifestation of something hidden or concealed within the human psyche. Thus the Spectre 
stands as a projected alien ‘in opposition to its creator’ (Prickett 1970, 23).  
The shock of remembrance 
We can also relate the anacoluthic spectrality of thwarted heritage and missed opportunity in 
Three Monkeys to Bloch’s work on the déjà vu. Here, the disorientating moment of an uncanny 
experience irrupts as a re-encounter with a place, image or person. The re-visitation emerges 
in such a way that it appears to contain the experiential roots of having been lived through 
before (already seen). However, the déjà vu via Bloch suggests that such fleeting and 
momentary experiences contain the undeciphered code of a utopian latency. The strange 
encounter is inevitably bordered by a sense of shock, as the occurrence interrupts and disrupts 
the stability and routine of everyday life. As a seemingly forgotten and fleeting fragment, the 
intensity of the resurfacing of its content ruptures through the temporal experience and routine 
of the present. A troubling event, it is as though an archived remembrance, of a replicated 
moment is suddenly lived in the same way. However, for Bloch, the déjà vu experience does 
not contain the replicative material of an already-seen and identically experienced ‘life‘. 
Rather, for him, the déjà vu encounter is activated by ‘an inner state that has been touched upon 
previously in an identical fashion, in much the same circumstances . . . only the intention, not 
the content, of an experience occurs‘ (Bloch 1998, 201-2). The apparition of the ghostly child 
operates as a cipher which shocks and reawakens the recognition of a disrupted fragment from 
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the past, one which is littered with associations of aborted beginnings and stalled possibilities. 
However, the imaginative space which emerges from the shadow of the apparition has the 
potential to transform into a point of creative growth (Ibid. 39). As such, the latency associated 
with re-seeing the spectral apparition of the lost brother or son is shocking, because it reflects 
back to its witnesses an existential fall into something that has been broken off, interrupted, or 
overlooked.  
Bloch establishes a further distinction between the act of merely recollecting a memory, 
which he terms anamnesis, and a more active or future-potent form of memory associated with 
an active recognition, which he terms anagnorisis. The notion of anamnesis, is taken from the 
Platonic doctrine that all knowledge arises from the recollection of images and Forms already 
seen in the transcendental world before birth (Hudson 1982, 78). It suggests that we have 
knowledge only because we previously knew, and that the recollection of memorial matter 
unfolds as though everything has been already and previously Formed (Landmann 1975). 
Alternatively, anagnorisis, as a quite distinct and separate understanding, refers to the process 
of recognition. Bloch repurposes this Aristotelian notion to articulate the momentary shock and 
recognition of absence within the immediacy of the lived moment, a recognition tinged with 
the notion that something is missing and needs to be actively and creatively pursued. As 
Micheal Landmann usefully notes here: 
Anamnesis provides the reassuring evidence of complete similarity; anagnorisis, 
however, is linked with reality by only a thin thread; it is therefore alarming. Anamnesis 
has an element of attenuation about it, it makes everything a gigantic déjà vu, as if 
everything had already been  ... But anagnorisis is a shock ... In anagnorisis there must 
always be a distance between the former and present reality otherwise it wouold not be 
so difficult and astonishing (Landmann 1975, 178-79).  
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Unlike Platonic anamnesis, anagnoretic trace recollections are unfinished and contain 
subjective traces of possibility. Anagnorisis therefore takes account of the potential of the 
future as being loaded with unarticulated traces of alternative possibility; and, with this, the 
ability to move towards overcoming the past and transforming the future (Luz 1993, 364).  
Within the spectrum of different notions of oblivion, memory and recognition sketched 
out above, Three Monkeys contains and develops a set of dominant themes that are quite 
anamnetic and Nietzschean in nature. In referring to the eternal return, Nietzsche writes, 
everything ‘becomes and recurs eternally – escape is impossible!’ (Nietszche 1968, 545), and 
‘the mechanistic and the Platonic – are reconciled in the eternal recurrence’ (Ibid. 546). In more 
detail, he clarifies: 
The world, even if it is no longer a god, is still supposed to be capable of the divine 
power of creation, the power of infinite transformations; it is supposed to consciously 
prevent itself from returning to any of its old forms; it is supposed to possess not only 
the intention but the means of avoiding any repetition; to that end, it is supposed to 
control every one of its movements at every moment [but] … the world, as force, may 
not be thought of as unlimited, … the world [ . . . lacks] the capacity for eternal novelty 
… everything that has been is eternal: the sea will cast it up again (Ibid. 548).  
The Nietzschean proposition that the Platonic, anamnetic and inescapable madeness of the 
world is ultimately replicative and eternal, chimes with the narrrative, characters and 
characteristics of the Three Monkeys; the themes and events constantly oscillate between 
foreseeable and more-or-less predictable scenarios. Throughout the film there is the continual 
sense that the characters are trapped within cycles of repetitive and fatalistic actions. Thus 
Hacer continually returns to the futility of Servet’s affections, but more striking, and of 
particular note, is Eyüp’s approach to Bayram in the café, where he repeats the previous pattern 
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of bribery and corruption (instigated by Servet) in an attempt to persuade Bayram to take 
responsibility for İsmail’s murder of Servet.  
However, with the more explicit tryptich of see, speak and hear no evil, the spectrality 
of the past murmurs an unspoken message of the future. In some renderings of the proverb of 
the three monkeys, there is a fourth – albeit missing – element, the monkey that represents the 
action of “do no evil“. This is the missing fourth element within Three Monkeys. Plagued by 
repetition, and a seeming inability to act differently and so escape their fate, the characters each 
harbour at least the potential to choose to act, and so live differently. Indeed, there is a 
distinction between ‘doing’ and ‘seeing’ (Augé 1995, 80), and one of the difficulties associated 
with the Nietzschean notion of continuity and eternal return is that the ‘discontinuities of lived 
duration generally prohibit an integral regaining of what one has left’ (Augé 2004, 71). In this 
sense, the spectre of the child inserts a trace of possibility into the film (however slight) which, 
in turn, suggests a latency of redemptive possibility. 
Let us, in order to further articulate this trace of possibility, return to Bloch and his 
doctrine of the not-yet. In conversation with an old friend, Bloch set out the following 
philosophically loaded formula: 
‘All great philosophers have been able to reduce their thought to one sentence … What 
would your sentence be?’ Bloch puffed on his pipe for a moment and then said, ‘That’s 
a hard trap to get out of. If I answer, then I’m making myself out to be a great 
philosopher. But if I’m silent, then it will appear as though I have a great deal in mind 
but not much I can say. But I’ll play the brash one instead of the silent one and give 
you this sentence: S is not yet P (Bloch 1970, 9).  
With this, Bloch invokes the Aristotelian category of "Subject is Predicate" (or 'S is P'), 
meaning that ‘subject’ or Being is ultimately predicated, established, or completed. However, 
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with the addition of his category of the not-yet, Bloch reformulates and challenges the 
assumptions inherent in this postulate. In order to appreciate the wider implications of Bloch's 
challenge to the 'S is P' formula, we must also consider Bloch’s repurposed notion of Aristotle's 
related concept of entelechy or creative matter.  
In The Metaphysics Aristotle asserts that ‘No one can believe that the same thing both 
is and is-not ... It is, then, not possible for opposites to be in the same subject at the same time’ 
(Aristotle 2004, 88). However, Aristotle recognizes the need to account for change and 
transformation. Thus within the Aristotelian schema alterations can and do occur, but these 
ultimately are a result of transitions associated with non-essential features. Change is therefore 
a manifestation of superficial flux, which leaves the fundamental constitution of ‘subject’ 
unaffected. It is this Aristotelian aspect that ‘S is Not-Yet P’ challenges. For Bloch, the entirety 
of matter (whether subjective substance, or otherwise) is open to fundamental adaptations and 
changes. Matter is ‘not yet’ in the sense that what the final state of matter can be is 
undetermined’ (Hudson 1982, 137). In this sense the formula ‘S is Not-Yet P’ fundamentally 
inverts the Aristotelian proposition ‘S is P’.13 For Bloch, contradictory states can indeed co-
habit the same subjective life world. The foundation and matter of ‘subject’ both is and is not-
yet. This means that the immediacy of Now, draped in the apparel of the past, is co-existent 
within and dialectically coupled with the perpetual immanence of the future. With Bloch, 
therefore, matter, subject and the future boil down to a latent and mysterious puzzle, which 
anagnoretically contains the possibility of fresh developments, new knowledge and 
                                                          
13 In relation to this, Bloch notes that, ‘Aristotle brought out the crucial idea ... of real, objective possibility, 
according to which matter, apart from being the mechanical condition for phenomenon to arise Kata to dynaton 
(“according to possibility”), was also, above all, the dynamei on, the “being-in-possibility” itself. Unfortunately, 
this was still thought of in passive terms: matter was as undefined as a lump of wax, and the “active, formative 
idea” impressed the particular form into it like a seal’ (Bloch, 2009, p. 215).  
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transformative actions. Thus Bloch’s anticipatory ontology of hope suggests that subjective 
and wider collective futures are far from settled. Rather, in order to arrive at new destinations, 
we have to embark and journey towards new possible ideas or ideals 
Herein lies the crux of the spectral theme of Three Monkeys, that whilst the dominant 
and indeed living characters within the film present themselves as solidified and un-malleable 
subjectivities, tamed and encapsulated into a stranded vessel of fatalism, a latent and alternative 
possibility haunts them and lingers. The spectre of the not-yet, on the periphery of the apparent 
fate of Eyüp, Hacer and İsmail, harbours a latent seed of potential waiting to be invoked. As 
such, the powerful habits and expectations associated with socially and relationally constrained 
routines pause the pseudo-finite and enclosed recurrence of a pre-assigned and inescapable 
fate. Servet, Eyüp and Hacer – see no evil, speak no evil, and hear no evil – play out and 
embody as anthropomorphic characters the Platonic and Nietzschean doctrines of recurrence 
and repetition. However, the creative and anagnoretic traces elicited by the spectre of thwarted 
childhood (the boy spectre), and İsmail’s stolen heritage at the hands of corrupt, self-interested 
and immoral ‘others’, suggest that redemption and the hidden latency of restoration is indeed 
possible. 
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